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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the logic of collective action in R&D.  Using a case study on an 
international plant breeding consortium, the Latin American Fund for Irrigated Rice 
(Spanish acronym FLAR), as well as other institutional examples connected to plant 
breeding, we construct a more general argument on collective action in R&D. 
 
The topic at hand presents a formidable methodological challenge.  Olson (1965) 
formulated a compelling “Logic of Collective Action” using a few very parsimonious 
models.  Such ideas ought to be applicable to research and development (R&D).   
However, a variety of complicating factors make it hard to summarize collective 
action in R&D in terms of a relatively simple logic.   These complicating factors are 
modelable when addressed in isolation from each other.  Considered in combination, 
they are too complex for a single tractable model.  Consequently, the best the present 
paper can do is to review relevant features of collective arrangements such as FLAR 
and discuss these, using several strands of more rigorous literature, one at a time.  The 
insights thus obtained are integrated by means of narration and intuition, not 
mathematics.  A companion paper currently under construction develops a rigorous 
game-theoretic model of a plant breeding consortium, but leaves out many of the 
relevant institutional issues.  The present paper sacrifices rigor for the sake of a fuller 
discussion.  However, the paper does relate to mathematical reasoning and may 
contain a dozen or so ideas for original and rigorous models. 
 
The FLAR case study – used to illustrate many of our points – can be found in a 
separate paper (Binenbaum et al. 2003).  FLAR is a consortium of nationally   2
representative organizations from a group of Latin American countries.  It was 
founded in 1995 to conduct a range of activities – primarily plant breeding – related to 
irrigated rice.  Recently, the first FLAR varieties were released.  In addition to FLAR, 
we will draw examples from other institutional arrangements, including the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and its Centers, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources (PGR) For Agriculture (“the International Treaty”), the so-called 
In-Trust Agreement between the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the 
CGIAR Centers, and the Australian R&D Corporations (RDCs). 
 
2. Two core issues: Impure public goods and complementary assets 
 
Classics of the collective-action literature such as Buchanan (1965), Cornes & Sandler 
(1996), G. Hardin (1968), R. Hardin (1982), Olson (1965), and Samuelson (1954; 
1955) focus on incentive problems that arise as a consequence of the public-goods 
characteristics of non-rivalry (also known as non-diminishability) and non-
excludability.  R&D outputs can typically be characterized as (often impure) public 
goods due to imperfect rivalry and/or imperfect excludability.  The public-goods 
nature of R&D outputs is clearly a core issue in the institutional design of the 
production of such outputs. 
 
The precise public-goods characterization of R&D outputs is not a straightforward 
matter.  The excludability afforded by intellectual property (IP) rights (IPR) is far 
from perfect, due to various costs, the existence of multiple jurisdictions, and 
imperfect enforcement.  Moreover, many types of R&D output are not patentable in   3
most jurisdictions.  For example, Latin American IP systems do not allow patent 
protection for plant varieties; instead, they use a weaker form of IPR, plant variety 
protection (PVP).  R&D outputs may not be completely non-rivalrous either.  It is true 
that one player’s possession of knowledge does not diminish the amount of 
knowledge available to other players.  But if the players are competitors in product 
markets, then one player’s possession of information may enable her to capture 
another player’s market share.  Clearly, this introduces an aspect of R&D output 
rivalry into the game. 
 
In cases of low excludability but high rivalry, the common-access-resource literature  
(which builds on Hardin 1968) may be relevant.  When excludability is high but 
rivalry low, a club-goods model (as pioneered by Buchanan 1965) may be more 
appropriate. 
 
There is a second core issue facing collective action in R&D: the need to combine 
complementary (synergistic) assets.  The assets may be tacit knowledge, codified 
information, IP, or technology-embodying objects such as genetic resources.  Hayek 
(1945) suggested – albeit in a different context – that the central economic problem is 
the combination of complementary knowledge fragments dispersed among many 
agents.  Graff et al. (2003) and Heller & Eisenberg (1998) point to the critical 
problem of combining complementary IP in the life sciences.  The present paper 
focuses on genetic resources as a prime example of complementary assets. 
 
Due to genetic combinatorics, plant breeding tends to be characterized by economies 
of scope and scale.  For this reason, cooperative plant breeding games where each   4
coalition pools its members’ PGR tend to satisfy the strict superadditivity property: 
for any two disjoint coalitions S and S’, the value of the combination exceeds the sum 
of the separate values:  () ( ) ( ) '' VS S VS VS ∪> + .  A simple superadditivity game 
with costless bargaining and transferable value has a unique and Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium: all PGR owners will join a grand coalition, share their genetic resources 
for a collective breeding program, and share the resulting benefits according to their 
respective bargaining positions.  This result, while trivial in its own right, is our 
starting point for constructing a “logic of collective action” in plant breeding (and 
R&D generally).  It will be referred to as the “baseline model”. 
 
The first key question, then, is: Which obstacles do R&D players need to overcome to 
combine their complementary assets?  There are several possible answers to that 
question, which can be used to create a taxonomy for analyzing collective action in 
R&D.  The “logic” in question is not a single rigorous game-theoretic model, but 
rather a system of such models – whose relative relevance varies depending on the 
public-goods characteristics of R&D outputs and other aspects of the real-world 
games we wish to understand.  Many of the answers – i.e. suggestions for obstacles to 
“perfect combination” – that follow may be subsumed under the heading of 
“transaction costs” – a term which we shall avoid due to its many interpretations. 
 
The second key question follows from the first: How do R&D players overcome 
obstacles to combining complementary assets?  The first question leads us to identify 
incentive problems; the second suggests a set of institutional solutions to those 
incentive problems.   5
3.  The hold-up obstacle and the Leviathan solution 
 
A variation on the baseline model may yield a drastically different result.  In hold-up 
games players have an incentive to wait to improve their bargaining positions during 
later negotiation rounds (Cohen 1998; Klein 1998).  Suppose that coalitions can grow 
in successive stages by allowing new members on board.  Is it possible for the grand 
coalition to emerge gradually by having players join one by one, negotiating with 
those already in the coalition?  Suppose that the last player to join has the strongest 
bargaining position, the next-to-last player the second-strongest, etc.  We can 
construct such a game so as to obtain an impossibility result: even in the presence of 
superadditivity, there exists no equilibrium with any coalition formation.  That is, 
there is no PGR sharing whatsoever. 
 
Now consider another model variation.  Consider again the extreme hold-up game, 
but now suppose that, prior to the formation of PGR sharing pools, the players can 
jointly create another player with the power of Principal and with the objective to 
maximize joint value and satisfy some sort of fairness criterion (say, Shapley values 
or the Nash bargaining solution).  Of course we will get the (trivial) result that the 
new player will be created if the cost of doing so is low enough.  This may be called 
the Leviathan result/game, as it is a variation on the theme – developed by Hobbes 
and subsequent Enlightenment and “contractarian” thinkers – of a social contract 
whereby players voluntarily delegate power to a government so as to avoid conflict 
among themselves (Kraus 1998). 
   6
We may also construct less extreme versions of hold-up and Leviathan games.  Thus, 
we can construct hold-up games that result in partial coalition formation, and 
Leviathan games that result in partial delegation of power. 
 
This is one possible rough explanation for the existence of FLAR.  Its members 
agreed to yield to it some of their control over PGR.  In fact, the FLAR agreement 
does not compel members to share all of their genetic resources, but it does provide a 
mechanism whereby members voluntarily place PGR in the FLAR breeding program.   7
4. Funding issues: reverse crowding out, willingness to pay 
 
So far, we have ignored the fact that a plant breeding program needs inputs other than 
PGR.  Sharing of PGR is not enough: there must be a funding arrangement.  In the 
case of FLAR, this is not just an obvious fact – it is the key to understanding FLAR’s 
genesis.  FLAR emerged as a funding arrangement to enable the continuation of an 
existing breeding program, namely the irrigated-rice program of the International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture (Spanish acronym, CIAT), one of the CGIAR 
Centers.  Due to a budgetary setback unrelated to the program, it had to be 
discontinued; it was at this point that CIAT’s Director-General, Grant Scobie, and its 
rice economist, Luis Sanint, decided to try and mobilize funds from the Latin 
American rice sector (Binenbaum et al. 2003).  The CGIAR is a conduit for 
development assistance, institutionally close to the World Bank; and the conception 
and birth of FLAR fit into a larger trend – discernable from the 1980s onwards – 
towards greater self-reliance of recipients of aid.
1 
 
More generally, in agricultural R&D, there often is an ‘outside’ player or group of 
players (outside of the industry, that is) willing to provide R&D subsidies.  This may 
be the community of rich countries, charitable foundations, and/or the domestic 
government.  Development assistance is but one of the possible motivations.
2  While 
private-sector agricultural R&D has grown in significance, the public sector is still an 
                                                 
1 Other manifestations of this trend include microcredit (pioneered through the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh) and participatory plant breeding. 
2 From a political economy perspective, lobby-driven support of agriculture (in rich countries) or 
indirect support of poor urban consumers (in poor countries) may be important domestic drivers of 
agricultural R&D subsidies.  From a social welfare perspective, such subsidies may be justifiable due 
to benefits external to the industry, including consumer benefits, R&D spillovers, and the option value 
of conservation of agro-biodiversity.  These two perspectives combined may produce a balanced view 
of agricultural policy (Rausser 1982), including its R&D aspects. 
   8
important player to agricultural R&D in the rich world, and even more so in the 
developing world (Pardey & Beintema 2001).  In many cases public-sector 
institutions will want to explore the possibility of a partial or full retreat from 
agricultural R&D funding; FLAR is one possible institutional model for such a 
retreat.  In linking the FLAR funding scenario to economic theory, it is crucial to 
distinguish between “crowding in” and “reverse crowding out.”  “Crowding in” and 
“crowding out” both refer to the effect of public-sector spending on private-sector 
spending; in the case of crowding in (out), this effect is positive (negative).  In other 
words, the terms mean that public and private expenditures are strategic complements 
or substitutes, respectively.  If, as in the FLAR case, a reduction in public expenditure 
results in increased private expenditure, then we should speak of “reverse crowding 
out.” 
 
A model of reverse crowding out can easily be constructed.  An R&D consortium S’s 
value  () VSis a function of – among other things – its budget, which is the sum of its 




=∑ .  We can make the following two ‘natural’ (in 
terms of modeling technique) assumptions: 
22 /0 ;/ 0   VB VB ∂∂ >∂ ∂< .  Now ignore 
all other complicating factors and assume the baseline model, with one additional 
feature: the presence of an exogenous subsidy, which is some fraction of the optimal 
funding amount  * B .  The budget contributions  k b  are the Nash bargaining solution.  
Now consider a simple comparative statics exercise.  Suppose that the subsidy is 
exogenously reduced, then under the assumptions made, all  k b  will increase.  This is a 
“reverse crowding out” result.  This result can be reproduced in the context of more   9
complex models that accommodate more of the FLAR facts, and captures part of the 
essence of FLAR’s history. 
 
An important theme in the public goods literature is that private information on 
willingness to pay constitutes a major obstacle to efficient public goods provision.  In 
fact, private information on the willingness to share PGR may also hamper efficient 
collective action – another real-world feature ignored so far in this paper. 
 
The public goods literature suggests that nifty revelation mechanisms such as the one 
devised by Groves & Ledyard (1977) may achieve second-best results in the presence 
of such informational asymmetries.  In FLAR, however, we do not observe such a 
sophisticated scheme.  Instead, funding is tied to a country’s rice output – a likely 
correlate of willingness (or ability) to pay.  In this way, FLAR has saved itself 
cumbersome negotiations; this was a provision that all prospective members could 
easily agree on.  It is an open question whether one of the sophisticated revelation 
mechanisms could have been put in place with the consent of all members – at the 
very least this would have entailed costlier negotiations, and a more complex and less 
transparent consortium agreement. 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that the funding arrangement of FLAR and other 
agricultural R&D consortia may be a third-best solution at best.  Funding shares are 
based on an imperfect correlate of willingness to pay, and will thus vary in 
relationship to players’ true and undisclosed willingness to pay.  With funding shares 
constrained in this way, and given the sovereignty of all prospective consortium 
members, one would expect the consortium’s overall budget to be under-funded   10
relative to the social optimum.  The ‘marginal member’ – the one whose funding 
share is the highest relative to her willingness to pay, and just about agrees to join the 
consortium – may exert a disproportionate and downward influence on the 
consortium’s overall budget. 
 
One can also construct an extreme case, in which the funding-shares-determination 
problem is so severe that the consortium fails to form in spite of there being a social 
welfare rationale for it.   11
5. Thresholds; asymmetries; member capabilities; third parties 
 
Start-up thresholds constitute another potential obstacle to efficient collective action.  
Collective institutions such as FLAR need a certain critical mass to be viable.  As it is, 
FLAR is fairly small, having a six-digit annual budget in dollar terms; it may be not 
far above its critical mass.  The threshold idea can be modeled using a standard U-
shaped average cost curve, i.e.  () ,... VB  exhibiting increasing returns to B initially, 
decreasing returns at higher levels of B, and/or a fixed start-up cost.  Olson (1965) 
takes these features into account in his model of collective action. 
 
In many cases of R&D consortia, including FLAR, the players’ size matters.  Most 
formal models of R&D consortia do not take into account size.  Most of these models 
think of the typical consortium member as being a firm which does not face a budget 
constraint.  Even with players who do not differ ex ante, a game may yield 
asymmetric equilibria in terms of strategies and/or payoffs.  Models of R&D consortia 
with more than two members, such as that of Katz (1986), use ex-post symmetry as a 
modeling device that enables them to prove many of their most interesting 
propositions.  To our knowledge, only one recent paper, Amir et al. (2003), manages 
to model an R&D consortium while disposing of ex-post firm symmetry. 
 
Non-profit players and ex-ante asymmetry between firms seem to be unexplored 
themes in models of cooperative R&D.  FLAR’s members vary widely in size; the 
largest member country, Brazil, has an output of irrigated rice which is about 80 times 
that of the smallest one, Guatemala, and a factor 10 or more larger than either of four 
other member countries.  What does this imply in game-theoretic terms?  In Olson’s   12
(1965) model of collective action, there is a tendency for exploitation of large group 
members by small ones, in the sense of the former bearing a disproportionate share of 
the costs.  This is because larger members tend to have greater stakes in the joint 
project, creating an opportunity for smaller ones to free-ride on the former’s 
contributions.  In cases such as FLAR, this effect is unlikely, because bargaining 
power appears to be correlated with size. 
 
FLAR members differ vastly not only in terms of output, but also in terms of R&D 
capabilities.  Output is correlated with R&D capability.  Brazil’s national agricultural 
research system (NARS) has a large budget and is in qualitative as well as 
quantitative terms a global player.  It has much to offer to FLAR or to other players in 
terms of rice varieties, expertise, facilities, etc.  Brazil would be an interesting 
agricultural R&D partner for multinationals such as Monsanto.  These factors 
contribute to Brazil’s bargaining strength within FLAR.  Similar considerations apply 
to other relatively large FLAR member countries such as Colombia.  One might 
expect to observe an effect opposite to Olson’s, namely ‘exploitation’ of the small by 
the great.  However, that would probably contravene political legitimacy.  FLAR 
definitely has political aspects, and it might well be unacceptable in domestic politics 
for the organization representing a small rice-producing country to be seen as securing 
an unfairly small share of FLAR’s net benefits.     13
6. Group size; crowding in; global system 
 
With widely dispersed consumer benefits that occur in addition to more concentrated 
producer benefits, there exists a social-welfare rationale for arrangements such as the 
Australian RDCs.  FLAR differs from the RDCs in that it is international with a 
layered structure – while its member organizations represent large groups of farmers 
and related businesses, they themselves constitute only a small group.  Olson (1965) 
suggests that provision of collective goods is suboptimal in small groups, but that this 
suboptimality will be more serious as group size increases, with zero provision of the 
collective good a quite likely outcome in a very large group.  In the case of the 
Australian RDCs, the consortium members are individual farmers.  The RDCs are 
industry-specific, for example for grains, cotton, dairy, and so on, and are funded by 
levies (also called commodity checkoffs) collected from industry producers and 
supplemented by government matching grants (Alston et al. 1999).  This funding 
arrangement roughly corresponds to the dispersed consumer benefits and more 
concentrated farmer benefits. 
 
By Olson’s logic, the group of, say, Australian cotton farmers is so large that, absent 
government involvement, they might not have engaged in collective action.  The 
matching grants arrangement may have pushed producers’ groups across the threshold 
of collective action.  Thus industry funds appear to have been mobilized in the RDC 
case through a mechanism different from that in the case of FLAR – crowding in, as 
opposed to reverse crowding out.  However, an element of crowding in may be 
present in FLAR as well.  CIAT is a FLAR member, contributing about 15% of its 
budget; FLAR is located on the CIAT campus and links PGR contributed by FLAR   14
members to the CGIAR’s global system of genebanks and PGR exchanges.  Thus, 
rice varieties from other parts of the world are available for crosses with member-
supplied varieties.  This link with the global public agricultural R&D system helps to 
make FLAR participation an attractive proposition for members, and encourages them 
to contribute their PGR.  This can be seen as a form of crowding in. 
 
 
    15
7. Genetic resource sharing & incomplete contracts; Output competition & 
collusion 
 
The sharing of PGR is problematic, even among consortium members.  In cases such 
as FLAR, players would never have consented ex ante to complete PGR sharing.  
Under fundamental uncertainty concerning rice markets and the future value of any 
PGR, and under conditions of great strategic complexity, players are extremely 
reluctant to give up all control over their key assets – PGR.  Thus, it is left up to 
FLAR members to share, or not share, their PGR with FLAR.  Thus, a consortium 
like FLAR needs an incentive mechanism to encourage PGR sharing.  Part of this 
involves rules to protect against leakage of FLAR varieties to third parties (see 
below).  Another part of this mechanism involves ex ante rules on property rights. 
 
It is clearly not feasible to stipulate ex ante a property rights allocation for each and 
every specific variety developed by FLAR – uncertainty and complexity are too great 
for this.  For example, it is not even clear ex ante which successful varieties will 
emerge from FLAR’s breeding efforts.  Thus, we have a clear case of incomplete 
contracting, where most future contingencies cannot be covered by an ex ante contract 
(the consortium agreement).  Instead, the best the ex ante contract can do is to 
stipulate a few simple, general rules on property rights allocation. 
 
Genetic resource sharing may in this context be viewed as relationship-specific 
investments which occur after the ex ante contract has been agreed upon.  Thus, 
insights from the incomplete contracting literature (pioneered in the late 1980s by 
Grossman, Hart and Moore, e.g. Grossman & Hart 1986), which features games with   16
incomplete ex ante contracts combined with relationship-specific investments and 
renegotiation, may be applicable to R&D consortia such as FLAR.
3  Due to its 
incompleteness, the ex ante contract is too blunt an incentive instrument to induce the 
optimum level of specific investment.  Thus, some under-investment relative to the 
first-best outcome is inevitable.  In the case of plant breeding consortia, this means 
that suboptimal PGR sharing is likely. 
 
Grossman & Hart (1986) show that the second-best ex ante property rights allocation 
is the one that gives the relevant property rights to the player whose specific 
investment adds the most value to the jointly developed product.  Thus, property 
rights are allocated so as to minimize the efficiency loss due to under-investment.  
FLAR has an arrangement in place which might roughly – but only roughly – follow 
this principle.  Each member gets the domestic PVP rights to plant varieties developed 
by FLAR. 
 
In analyzing the likely (in-)efficiency properties of consortium arrangements such as 
this,  it is important to consider the degree of competition (or rivalry, in public-goods 
terms) in output markets.  This is a key component of R&D consortium models such 
as Katz (1986).  Members’ ex ante commitments in the consortium agreement, as well 
as their level of cooperative behavior once the consortium is in place, depend on it.  In 
Katz (1986), the consortium output vector consists of members’ scalar cost 
parameters of a single product. They then compete in the output market with their 
reduced cost parameters.  Competitors’ prospective cost reductions are a disincentive 
for cooperative behavior of consortium members.  In FLAR, the situation is more 
                                                 
3 Rosenkranz & Schmitz (2003) may provide some clues as to how to model this aspect of R&D 
consortia.  It combines an incomplete contracting approach with analysis of mutual know-how 
disclosure in a two-firm partnership.   17
complex.  Rice varieties are the main FLAR output.  These first need to be tested 
(mostly by members) before they can be released.  They are subsequently sold as 
seeds to farmers, who sell the resulting output on domestic markets or export it.  Rice 
exports of FLAR members are fairly insignificant, with one important exception.  The 
size of members’ domestic seed markets is probably correlated with their capacity to 
contribute valuable PGR to FLAR, but if so, this correlation will be far from perfect.  
Thus, we obtain an insight similar to that concerning the FLAR funding arrangement: 
the FLAR IP allocation mechanism makes sense, but is likely to be no better than a 
third-best solution compared to the socially optimal level.  Thus, we can expect FLAR 
to induce some sharing of PGR (without with which FLAR would probably not be a 
worthwhile endeavor), but we can also expect that some opportunities for mutually 
beneficial PGR sharing by members will be forfeited.  There are some indications of 
this in the case of FLAR (Binenbaum et al. 2003). 
 
The one exception to the pattern of insignificance of rice exports of FLAR members is 
Uruguay, which exports large amounts of rice (worth between US$ 100 and 300 
million annually) to Brazil, in direct competition with Brazilian rice producers.  In 
terms of the preceding analysis, the organization representing Uruguay in FLAR 
might have a greater disincentive than other members to share promising PGR with 
FLAR, as these materials could be used to create FLAR varieties which would then 
become available to Uruguayan and Brazilian farmers alike.  To a lesser extent, a 
similar argument may apply to Brazilian PGR sharing, which might benefit 
Uruguayan competitors. 
   18
The consortium itself may be a means for competitors to reduce competition in the 
output market (Katz 1986; see also subsequent work by Katz and Shapiro).  An 
interesting FLAR provision which may have a collusive aspect is its rule for royalties.  
The FLAR agreement stipulates specific formulas for royalties percentages, should 
FLAR members license their PVP for FLAR varieties to third parties (Binenbaum et 
al. 2003).  This provision is included in the agreement to prevent FLAR members 
from being played off against each other when they negotiate licensing contracts with 
third parties.  This collusive provision may well be justifiable in social welfare terms, 
because it enhances members’ incentives to share their PGR with FLAR and 
strengthens their bargaining positions with multinationals, thus counterbalancing the 
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8. Genetic resource sharing & prisoner’s dilemma; multi-stage game; leadership 
 
Another way to relate the issue of incentives for genetic resource sharing to economic 
theory is to apply the logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Consider the payoffs of PGR 
sharing.  With the consortium arrangement in place, and taking account of the IP 
provisions discussed in the previous section, we can think of a member’s decision to 
share – or not to share – PGR with FLAR as follows.  There is an incentive problem 
in that PGR sharing tends to result in net positive externalities for fellow members.  
The member’s own benefits from sharing arise because FLAR has a unique capability 
for upgrading PGR.  Having your PGR upgraded rather than somebody else’s means 
that the resulting FLAR varieties are more likely to be specifically suitable for your 
country’s agro-ecological conditions.  However, sharing also means that you forfeit 
the opportunity of independent development of your PGR, or of independent deals 
with third players like multinationals.  It also means that you might be helping your 
competitors.  Sharing your PGR with FLAR means that you steer FLAR’s research 
agenda more in your direction, but it also implies adding to FLAR’s gene pool.  The 
former effect may imply a negative externality for other members, but the latter effect 
– a positive externality – is probably stronger. 
 
In a subset of cases, PGR sharing will not appear attractive to members, but it would 
be optimal in terms of the total net benefits of FLAR members.  This is the subset of 
member-owned PGR for which the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) may be relevant, 
because the payoffs conform to the PD.  The PD essentially describes a situation 
where there are mutual positive externalities associated with cooperative behavior,   20
which does not occur because the payoffs net of those externalities favor non-
cooperation. 
 
So far in this paper we have ignored the theoretical complication of multiple stages in 
the PGR sharing game.  Of course it is a multi-stage (or, if modeled in continuous 
time, differential) game.
4  The Folk Theorem tells us that a wide range of equilibria 
are sustainable in an infinitely repeated PD, including the unique one-shot non-
cooperative Nash Equilibrium as well as the Pareto-efficient cooperative outcome.  
Neyman (1999) extends this result to the case of finitely repeated PD where the 
common knowledge assumption regarding the number of stages is slightly perturbed.  
In other words, if the players face (even slight) uncertainty about when the game ends, 
cooperation can be sustained in a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).   
Neyman’s model appears to broadly reflect FLAR’s stylized facts, except for it being 
an R&D consortium which upgrades the PGR shared by members in successive 
stages.  Thus, to treat the stages of the PGR sharing game as identical is quite a stretch 
compared to the essentials of the real-world game.  Nevertheless, one would expect 
Neyman’s result to be generalizable to the case of multi-stage sharing and upgrading 
of PGR.  In fact, the fundamental uncertainty inherent in R&D would appear to 
strengthen his result in that reality is, in fact, far removed from the assumption of 
common knowledge of the number of stages of the game. 
 
The presence of multiple SPNE, of course, raises the question of which SPNE will be 
realized.  This is the subject of the literature on coordination games (reviewed in 
Cooper 1998).  A one-shot PD with costless coordination and perfect contractual 
                                                 
4 The FLAR decision-making process, like many other nonprofit and for-profit governance systems. 
follows an annual cycle; thus we might think of it as a multi-stage game where each stage represents 
one year.   21
enforcement of course yields the optimal result.  The problem is that coordination 
(including communication) and enforcement are costly.  In cases such as FLAR, the 
sovereign status of members and the absence of a strong international system of legal 
interpretation and enforcement renders coordination problematic.  For encouragement 
of cooperative behavior such as PGR sharing, FLAR may depend on future 
repercussions of (non-)cooperation, especially on other members’ sharing or 
withholding of PGR.  It should also be pointed out that most of the individual 
decision-makers in the FLAR community belong to the same professional community 
(that of plant breeding and public agricultural R&D management), which may be a 
positive factor for cooperative behavior. 
 
Leaders such as the FLAR director might play a role in encouraging sharing behavior.  
What is needed here in terms of economic theory is a model of leadership.  In the 
context of multi-stage games, leadership can be defined as the ability to alter the 
payoffs or the rules of the coordination game such that players reach a dynamic 
equilibrium which is socially superior to the equilibrium that would obtain in the 
absence of the leader’s intervention.  This concept of leadership has, to our 
knowledge, not been modeled so far.
5  Such a model might well be applicable to a 
wide variety of games, given the generality of the Folk Theorem and of Neyman’s 
(1998) results. 
 
The personal leadership of Grant Scobie and Luis Sanint may have been critical to the 
formation of FLAR.  Although it is impossible to prove this counterfactual, one 
                                                 
5 Hermalin (1998) is, to our knowledge, the only extant game-theoretic model of leadership.  The 
aspect of leadership that he focuses on, however – namely, the ability of leaders to lead by example in a 
moral-hazard-in-teams setting – is entirely different from the conception of leadership we’re suggesting 
here.   22
senses that in the absence of their initiative the joint Latin American program of 
irrigated rice breeding might have died prematurely following CIAT’s budget cut. 
 
The International Treaty on PGRFA may be viewed as an instance of players’ 
inability to reach an optimal outcome in a PD.  The formation of FLAR precedes the 
International Treaty, but once the latter becomes operational, FLAR will operate 
within its rules.  Fortunately for FLAR, rice is included as one of the crops included in 
the sharing mechanism provided for by the Treaty, so that the FLAR breeding 
program will have access to varieties coming from rice-rich countries such as China, 
which have rice R&D budgets that dwarf that of FLAR or its members.  Rice might 
have been included in the Treaty’s mechanism for PGR sharing in spite of its being 
the world’s most important crop in terms of value of output, because the bulk of rice 
sales are on domestic markets (Binenbaum et al. 2001).  However, some other crops 
that are important only as poor people’s staple crops were, in fact, excluded from the 
Treaty, along with several major cash crops: “The list of crops covered by the 
multilateral system, which is ostensibly constructed on the basis of food security, 
includes some 35 crops... and approximately 80 (of 30,000) species of forages.  Most 
major crops are covered, including rice, wheat, maize, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, 
sugercane, melons, grapes, cocoa, coffee, and most industrial crops such as oil palm 
and rubber.  In many cases, individual regions or countries concluded that they might 
gain more from withholding these resources from the multilaterial system and then 
seeking to sell them bilaterally.  China, the center of diversity for soybeans, insisted 
that soybeans be excluded, and when this was done, Latin America withdrew 
groundnuts.  Not to be outdone, Africa took tropical forages off the table.  This 
process may help the reader understand the irony of how a list of crops crucial to   23
world food security contains asparagus and strawberries, but is missing soybeans, 
groundnuts, tropical forages and most ‘poor people’s crops” (Falcon & Fowler 2002: 
211).  This example clearly evokes a variation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e. one that 
occurs in the context of multilateral bargaining under severe time pressure.  The 
failure of blocks of negotiating countries to achieve the socially optimal outcome may 
have been due to a number of factors: (1) the one-off nature of this negotiating 
process, rendering it similar to a one-shot game; (2) the blocks’ perceived opportunity 
cost of sharing their “crown jewels,” where the crown jewels could either be high-
value cash crops such as soybeans or high-profile staples in terms of domestic 
politics; (3) negotiators’ desire not to appear to easily surrender such crown jewels 
and be exploited by the other players, again due to domestic politics; and (4) the 
absence of leadership and legal enforcement, rendering coordination very difficult; 
this being an ‘intercontinental’ game may make these obstacles even more severe than 
in the case of FLAR.  Factors (2), (3) and (4), combined with the siginificant positive 
externalities of the rest of the world of PGR sharing by one world region, imply that 
PD payoffs may accurately describe this real-world game. 
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9. Public-private division of labor; outside players 
 
To complete the policy picture, we have to place consortia such as FLAR in the 
context of the global public-private division of labor in agricultural R&D.  FLAR is 
not a purely public-sector consortium.  Its member organizations (one ‘representative’ 
per participating country) range in nature from 100% public to 100% private.  Many 
points made in the foregoing discussion suggest that FLAR may be under-funded, and 
that the level of sharing of plant-genetic resources within FLAR may be suboptimal.  
In addition, FLAR faces pressures due to fluctuations in the world price of rice.  The 
lower the price, the smaller the medium-term expected benefits of FLAR, and the 
greater the pressure on FLAR, with members possibly contemplating quitting it (and 
saving their annual contributions).  FLAR also faces difficult coordination problems.  
It instituted the rule of single-organization per country, sanctioned by the country’s 
government and co-opted by the other members, in order to keep its short-term 
‘subgames’ manageable.  However, this compromises FLAR’s objective of being 
inclusive of 100% of each member country’s irrigated rice sector.  Member countries 
without a leading public-sector or collective-private player tend to favor an alternative 
and more inclusive arrangement, where any Latin American player in irrigated rice 
R&D, including any number of private firms, could joint it.  This would FLAR closer 
to the private end of the public-private spectrum.  FLAR’s sister consortium 
CLAYUCA (its counterpart in cassava breeding) has this more inclusive, more 
private-sector oriented setup.  Finally, all of these tensions are exacerbated by the 
long-term nature of plant breeding: Only recently, a decade after FLAR’s genesis, 
have the first FLAR varieties been released.  It is quite an achievement for FLAR’s 
leaders to have sustained the institution in the face of political short-termism.   25
 
On plus side, two positive factors contribute to FLAR’s continued appeal to its 
members, and may help explain its continued existence.  First and foremost are the 
long-term rates of return of public agricultural R&D, which by all accounts tend to be 
high or very high.
6  Second, these can be obtained primarily through FLAR because 
of its strong linkage to the international system of PGR exchanges which is managed 
mostly by the CGIAR.  The inclusion of rice into the International Treaty strongly 
enhances FLAR’s appeal. 
 
In the absence of collective-action arrangements such as FLAR or the RDCs, for-
profit firms would likely seek to fill the gap, as there appears to be sufficient 
excludability through PVP (and patents in some jurisdictions) (Lindner .  However, 
this would entail its own incentive problems.  Multinationals’ market power would 
probably be enhanced.  Perhaps even more seriously, private firms would be far more 
likely to run into trouble contributing to and accessing the existing system of 
international PGR exchanges.  It should be added that, in the current arrangement, 
there is already an ‘interactive gap’ between collective institutions such as FLAR and 
multinationals such as Monsanto.  The latter have a far higher profile in genetic 
modification (GM) technology than institutions like FLAR, and the lack of 
interchange between the Monsantos and the FLARs may be depriving the developing 
world of potentially valuable applications of GM technology.  There is a clear 
division of labor between the private and public (or hybrid public-private like FLAR) 
agricultural R&D sectors, which may be beneficial to the world in terms of 
comparative advantage.  The multinationals focus on a small number of high-value 
                                                 
6 Alston et al. (2000) identify methodological flaws due to which many studies of public investment in 
agricultural R&D find unrealistically high rates of return, but their revised rates of return are still high 
enough to amply warrant continued collective action in agricultural R&D.   26
crops; the public and hybrid R&D institutions have a far broader R&D agenda, 
including ‘orphan crops’ and staple crops for poor consumers. 
 
Collective R&D institutions may have a problem of organizational focus.  In the case 
of FLAR and the RDCs, this is well-defined, but in the case of the CGIAR and its 
Centers it is lacking.  The multi-donor sponsoring arrangement of the CGIAR and its 
Centers has lead to a system of a wide range of tiny projects, without clear 
organizational focus.  FLAR and the RDCs, in contrast, appear to have resolved this 
problem in a satisfactory manner. 
 
The global agricultural R&D system has moved from being predominantly public and 
nonprofit to having an important private and for-profit component.  It is important to 
remember the need for an appropriate balance as the importance of combining PGR 
and other inputs into agricultural R&D is difficult to underestimate.  This is the main 
component of the clear rationale for continued public-sector investment that this paper 
intends to lay out. 
 
However, it should also be remembered that the public sector is not immune to 
territorial behavior.  Herdt (1999) has likened the trend – from the 1980s onward – to 
claim property rights to PGR to a new ‘enclosure’ akin to the process by which the 
English landed aristocracy captured hitherto collectively ‘owned’ lands, at the 
expense of villagers.  In fact, by the logic of common-access resources (Hardin 1965), 
one would expect such a process to enhance incentives for efficient usage of the land, 
albeit at the expense of greater inequality (although this argument ignores the pre-
capitalist aristocracy’s proclivity for idleness).  One can argue that Herdt’s new   27
enclosure may, in fact, be worse, because it replaces the tragedy of the commons with 
a tragedy of the anticommons.  The CBD can be thought of as an attempt to overcome 
the tragedy of the commons.  It encouraged countries to think of their genetic 
resources as national treasures.  While this may have helped them defend themselves 
against biopiracy, the CBD has had as an unintended by-effect that it – along with the 
proliferation of IPR  and the rise of the private sector – contributed to the emergence 
of an anticommons problem in agricultural R&D. 
 
Especially in the present context, any attempt to formulate a logic of collective action 
in agricultural R&D must acknowledge the central importance of complementarity of 
dispersed R&D inputs such as PGR, along with the familiar public-goods 
characteristics of imperfect excludability and imperfect rivalry.   28
10. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
 
We suggest that the logic of collective action in plant breeding and in R&D generally 
revolves around two core types of incentive problems: imperfect public goods and 
complementarity of R&D inputs dispersed among multiple players.  Thus, the 
classical collective-action models of common-access resources and club goods are 
central to understanding collective action in R&D, but so is the more recent concept 
of the anticommons (the modeling of which is still in its infancy).  We propose to 
broadly interpret problems of collective action in plant breeding as having moved 
from a common-access problem – which was, perhaps, more of a perceived problem 
than an actually serious one – to a far more serious anticommons problem.  This 
historical context is critical to understanding the role that public-sector and collective 
initiatives may play in the future of plant breeding. 
 
We also suggest that the logic of collective action in R&D should be understood not 
only in terms of a small number of core models, which can be developed in stark, 
parsimonious, and rigorous terms, but additionally in terms of a complex of additional 
incentive problems, including – as illustrated in this paper – the hold-up problem, 
Leviathan games, crowding in and crowding out (preferably addressed in a single 
rigorous model to explain under what circumstances which of the two mechanisms 
applies), threshold effects, ex-ante and ex-post asymmetries among players, 
incomplete contracting and multi-stage Prisoners’ Dilemma’s in the context of R&D 
consortia, leadership as a key determinant of equilibrium selection in Folk Theorems 
and related finite games, etcetera.  It should be noted that none of these games appear 
to have been modeled as of yet, and so the present paper may demonstrate an   29
enormous gap in published game theory and contract theory as they pertain to 
collective action in R&D.  In spite of an explosion of literature in the past two 
decades applying rigorous modeling techniques to issues of collective action in R&D, 




It should be entirely obvious to any game theorist that the derivation of any results 
(even allowing for simulation techniques, which can accomodate greater complexity 
than analytical solution techniques) would be completely impossible if we were to 
model all of the features discussed in this paper in one grand model.  Nevertheless, 
they all are relevant to the real games under consideration.  Parsimonious, rigorous 
game modeling definitely has a role to play, as illustrated by the references in this 
paper to the game-theoretic literature and in the many as yet undeveloped ideas for 
game models suggested here.  But these rigorous games at best provide relevant 
insights into fragments of the complex real-world game.  For these reasons, any future 
account of collective action in R&D ought to include a meta-modeling narrative, i.e. 
some verbal account and conceptual model linking the separate models of 
supplementary incentive issues such as the undeveloped sketches hinted at in the 
present paper. 
 
In summary, the logic of collective action in R&D consists of two core sets of 
incentive issues, plus a set of supplementary incentive problems that fit together in 
some systematic but as of yet poorly understood way. 
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Arrangements such as that of FLAR as well as other institutions of collective action in 
research and development can only be properly understood in the context of such a 
logic, which is less parsimonious and more elaborate than that envisioned by pioneers 
of collective action models such as Olson. 
 
It is only with such an enhanced logic of collective action that we can understand 
important features of an institution such as FLAR – including the answer to key 
questions such as, for example, the following: 
1) How are the financial contributions determined? 
2) Is there a method for rewarding and valuing members’ IP contributions, and if so, 
what is it? 
3) Does the consortium own the new IP? 
4) What are the conditions – including royalty provisions – for licensing IP to 
members? 
5) Is consortium-produced IP licensed to non-members, and if so, what are the 
conditions for doing so? 
6) How are royalties for consortium-produced IP allocated? 
Questions such as these are relevant to any attempt at collective action in R&D, and to 
answer them separately, and especially to analyse them as an integrated system of 
issues, requires an enhance logic of collective action.   31
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